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1  Introduction  
Variation of commodity prices between locations and over time is a natural market 
phenomenon. In fact, price variation is necessary for the existence of a market, as it creates 
the incentives that attract market actors to engage in trade.  Thus, it is not the spatial 
differences in of prices per se that should be of concern to the policy makers, but rather 
excessive variability and, in some cases, no or little variability of staple food prices across 
space. Excessive variability of prices, to a large extent, is a reflection of a lack of market 
integration across space. On the other hand, no or little variability in prices has often been 
the outcome of policy interventions, such as pan-territorial pricing, which was common in 
African countries in the 1970s and 1980s and continues to be practiced in some developing 
countries today.     
Market locations across space often lack integration due to inadequate provision of public 
goods (such as infrastructure), inefficient flow of information, imperfect competition, and 
incomplete or missing institutions for risk management like credit and insurance—all of 
which qualify as sources of market failures. Historical evidence suggests that these forms of 
market failures have been an important causes of food insecurity, including famine in 
extreme cases. Economic theory tells us that policy interventions are justified, in the sense 
that they may increase aggregate welfare, if the interventions are properly designed and 
implemented to address those market failures in the short run; and to alleviate them all 
together in the long run. This implies that the policy objectives should focus on improving 
infrastructure, providing access to information, promoting competition, and developing risk 
management institutions.   
The underlying objective of market integration analysis is to provide better understanding in 
implementation of such short-  and long term policy interventions. Understanding the 
degree of market integration and the total transfer costs between pairs of markets can help 
diagnose problems in agricultural commodity markets.  For example, if market margins are 
significantly larger than the cost of transporting the commodity from one market to the 
other, this may indicate lack of market information, trade barriers, or credit constraints.  
Alternatively, if the costs of transportation are much higher between two markets than for 
other market pairs or in nearby countries, this may suggest that road quality, imperfect 
competition in the transport sector, or excessive checkpoints are an issue. 
In addition, knowledge of spatial market integration can also help better design social safety 
net programs, which are essential interventions irrespective of level of development of 
given country. For instance, food vouchers for the poor is one of the common safety net 
programs in many industrialized countries. In developing countries, there has been a long 
standing debate over the adverse effects of food aid distributed to the poor under 
emergencies and safety net programs. While has been no denying about the importance of 
safety net programs, it is often argued that cash transfer instead of food can lead to better 
outcome because food distribution can depress market price and have disincentive effects 
on farmers. However, the policy decision to give food or cash depends partly  on the 
efficiency of markets where beneficiaries live.  If markets are integrated, cash transfers are 
often  better because they  create demand that maintains incentives for local food 
production.  On the other hand, if markets are not integrated, then food transfers will Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 2 
 
generally work better. If markets lack integration, a local scarcity and subsequent price hike 
may not result in flow of food from the surplus region that may add to human suffering.
5
The main objective of this paper is to examine whether the staple food markets in Africa are 
efficient. It does so by outlining a conceptual framework for understanding spatial food 
price variation, summarizing the results from existing studies in market integration in sub-
Saharan Africa, and  providing  evidence from recently conducted surveys on the 
determinants of market efficiency.  The paper is organized following this sequence and 
concludes with a summary and policy implications.  
 
Furthermore, it may be difficult for the public agencies to mobilize resources and in case of 
emergencies if markets lack integration. This is the rationale for holding strategic food 
reserves in less accessible regions of a country.                 
   
                                                      
5 Historical evidence suggests that most food security crisis emerge from distribution & entitlement 
failure rather than production and availability of food (Sen, 1981).   Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 3 
 
 
2  Understanding market efficiency and market integration  
2.1  Key concepts 
Although market integration and market efficiency often used interchangeably, they are 
conceptually different, and understanding the differences is important for drawing policy 
implications.    Thus, it is useful to begin by defining these terms and several related 
expressions. 
Market integration refers to a situation in which a) the prices in different markets move 
together, b) there is trade between the markets, or c) both (Barrett, 2001).  In practice, 
most studies of market integration use price data, so in most cases, market integration is 
said to exist when price changes in one market are reflected in price changes in other 
markets.    There are several types of market integration, depending on the types of 
“markets” being compared.  Vertical market integration refers to the relationship between 
prices at different points in the supply chain, such as wholesale and retail prices.  Spatial 
market integration refers to the integration of prices for the same commodity in different 
locations.   
Market efficiency, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which markets minimize costs 
and match supply with demand.  More specifically, there are two types of market efficiency: 
exchange efficiency and operational efficiency.  Exchange efficiency (also called arbitrage 
efficiency) means that there are no unexploited opportunities for mutually beneficial trade.  
To illustrate, consider two market locations, say A and B, where prices of a staple food 
commodity are   and  , respectively, with market location A being surplus. Suppose the 
transfer cost
6  between the locations given  the  transportation and communication 
infrastructure of the country at a given point in time is 
•  If there is trade, then 
.   Then exchange efficiency implies 
that  
- = 
•  If 
 
- < 
In contrast, operational efficiency implies that there is no room for reducing transfer costs 
below the current level.  Short-run operational efficiency refers to the inability to reduce 
transfer costs in the short run, though changes in procedures or policies, while long-run 
operational efficiency refers to the inability to reduce transfer costs through investments, 
such as roads and communications networks. In practice, operational efficiency is a relative 
term, measured by comparing costs in different regions or countries.    
, then there is no trade 
2.2  Measuring spatial market integration and efficiency 
Since the onset of the structural adjustment program, considerable attention has been 
given to reaching a better understanding of agricultural market performance, especially for 
staple food crops. The increased interest in the subject is primarily due to the shift in policy 
focus towards market-led development, which envisaged rapid growth with reduced 
government intervention and private sector led market development. However, the early 
                                                      
6 Transfer cost refers to the full cost of moving the commodity from one location to another, including the  
transportation costs, the cost of loading and unloading, overhead, the opportunity costs of the owner 
(including time to identify a buyer and negotiate a price), risk premium, and normal profits. Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 4 
 
experiences had been mixed. There are studies to suggest that early reforms were not 
successful in boosting production in some developing and transition economies (Kherallah, 
et. al. 2002; Eicher 1999; and Seppala 1997). Theoretical studies provide link between 
output reduction and market performance. The central idea of this literature is that the 
emergence of healthy systems of market exchange takes time, as traders need to learn 
arbitrage skills and build market relationships (Blanchard 1997, McMillan 1995) before the 
full potentials of private sector led market development can be exploited.    
A substantial body of literature has evolved attempting to measure market integration in 
order to answer the broad policy reform and market performance question. The empirical 
methods have involved from simple price correlation between market locations in the 1970s 
to early 1980s, to lagged regression methods in the late 1980s and 1990s (Ravallion, 1986), 
to cointegration methods in the 1990s (Alderman, 1992; Goletti and Babu, 1994).   
Cointegration methods take into account the fact that prices be non-stationary, which 
causes standard regression analysis to give misleading results
7
Two recent approaches attempt to take into account transfer costs and the fact that prices 
in different markets should not be expected to move together if the price difference is less 
that the marketing cost between them.  They key features of these two models can be 
summarized as follows: 
.  It also provides information 
on the long-run relationship between prices and the speed of adjustment toward that long-
run relationship.  However, standard cointegration methods do not take into account the 
fact that prices may not move together because the transfer cost is too high to justify trade. 
•  The parity bounds model (PBM) estimates the proportion of the time a market pair is in 
each of three trading regimes: 1) when the price differences is equal to marketing costs, 
implying competitive trade and co-movement of prices, 2) when the when the 
differences is too small to generate trade, implying no co-movement of prices, and 3) 
when the price difference exceeds marketing costs, implying either temporary 
disequilibrium or market imperfections (Baulch, 1997).  The original version of PBM 
estimates transfer costs (under strong assumptions), while an extension of PBM uses 
outside information on transfer costs and market flows (Barrett and Li, 2002).  
•  The threshold autoregressive (TAR) model estimates a threshold in the price margin 
between two markets, above which trade is profitable, and we expect co-movement of 
prices and below which trade is not profitable and we do not expect co-movement.  The 
TAR model has been used to study transfer costs between markets (van Campenhout, 
2007 and Meyers, 2008) and asymmetry in price response to shocks (Abdulai, 2000).  As 
with PBM, the “threshold” can be estimated within the model or it can be fixed based on 
outside information. 
However,  even these new methods  have  been criticized.  For instance, the PBMs are 
criticized for being bivariate analyses (involving just two markets) of variables that emerge 
from a multivariate context (Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand, 2001; Fackler, 2004).  In addition, 
PBM results are sensitive to underlying distributional assumptions (Fackler, 1996; and 
Barrett and Li, 2002), and PBM assumes shocks are serially independent and hence failing to 
                                                      
7   Non-stationary variables do not have a constant mean or variance over time, one example being the 
“random walk” which has no tendency to return to a central value.  This violates one of the assumptions 
behind regression analysis.  The result is that regression analysis of non-stationary variables will often show a 
“relationship” where none exists.   Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 5 
 
explain dynamic adjustments (Fackler, 2004). On the other hand, the cointegration methods 
are criticized because integration is neither necessary nor sufficient for spatial market 
efficiency (McNew and Fackler, 1997; and Fackler and Goodwin, 2001).   Although the TAR 
model explicitly accounts for transfer costs, it does so in a bivariate context, and statistical 
tests for the two-threshold version of the TAR have not been developed (Meyers, 2008).   
In the next section, we illustrate some of these issues along with a discussion on the 
additional information needs for market integration analyses to be useful for policy 
guidance.   
2.3  Market efficiency and public policies 
While there have been significant improvements in  methods and data availability, the 
market integration analyses have not been of much use in policy decision. The older set of 
methods couldn’t go beyond answering whether different markets are integrated or not. 
Recent methods, PBM and TAR, provide additional insight in the sense that they are able 
detect equilibrium and disequilibrium. However, even the analyses with the latest methods 
are not conclusive about efficiency, as they rely on prices only because of the unavailability 
of actual data on transfer costs; and they do not offer specific guidance for policy makers to 
adopt. We explain these using two illustrative examples below. 
 Exchange efficiency without market integration 
Is it possible for efficient markets not to be integrated? Yes. Recall that exchange efficiency 
is defined as a situation in which there are no unexploited possibilities for mutually 
beneficial exchange, while integration between markets is defined in terms of market flows, 
co-movement of prices, or both.  If the transfer cost between the two markets is greater 
than the difference in prices between them, then trade between the two markets is not 
profitable. In this case, the markets may be efficient in the sense of  there being no 
unexploited opportunities for trade; in this case, trade would cost more than the benefits, 
so there is no mutually beneficial trade. And because there is no trade, changes in the price 
in one market will have no effect on prices in the other market, so the two markets are not 
integrated.   
Thus, cointegration analysis provides information on whether market prices are linked, the 
nature of the relationship, and the speed of adjustment over time, but the lack of market 
integration does not necessarily imply market inefficiency.  While knowing whether markets 
are integrated provides  a broad guideline, it does not tell us much about what causes 
transfer costs to be so high and what can be done to reduce the transfer costs, which is 
more useful to policy makers. 
This point has been made by Harriss (1979), Baulch (1997), and Barrett (2001), among 
others.  In spite of this, economists and others continue to infer, implicitly or explicitly, that 
lack of market integration implies market inefficiency.     
Market integration without market efficiency 
Conversely, it is also possible to have market integration without market efficiency.  For 
example, suppose that transfer costs are twice as high as they could be, either because of 
collusion among traders, regulated transportation rates, or a large number of check-points 
where “informal payments” must be made.  If the price difference between the two markets 
is large enough, there will be trade between the markets, co-movement of prices, and Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 6 
 
perhaps even rapid adjustment to changes in the other market, even though the market is 
not efficient. 
Another example concerns the case when there is a third market, call it market C, and that 
commodity trade occurs first from A to B and then from B to C, but not directly from A to C, 
implying an additional transaction costs and hence increase in the price of the commodity in 
the market location C. This may occur for several reasons: lack of capital to finance the 
longer trip, lack of trust (social capital) between traders in markets A and C, or language 
differences.  To make it a bit more complicated we could possibly add a few more stops 
between A and C and still argue that trade flow between the two locations is possible 
because price difference could be larger than sum of the transfer costs from one market to 
another between the two terminal locations.     
Two important questions arise from this illustration: (i) how would a market integration 
analysis, irrespective of the methods used, characterize this situation? and (ii) is this 
scenario realistic for African or any other developing country markets? The answer to the 
first question is straightforward: given that the conditions of market integration are 
satisfied, (i.e., prices move together and commodity flows from A to C), an empirical market 
integration analysis would concluded these markets to be integrated.  However, these 
markets are not efficient because commodity transfer is not taking place at minimum cost 
for the given level of infrastructure and information network of the country. In other words, 
additional market efficiency can be achieved by facilitating trade between markets A and C.   
To address the second question, we examine two agricultural market surveys, one in 
Ethiopia and the other in Uganda, conducted by IFPRI. Table 1  presents data from the 
Uganda survey showing the trading radius of the sampled maize traders.  The estimates on 
the distance between trading premise and both purchase and sales markets clearly supports 
the main point above: that is, given Ugandan traders carry out transactions within a radius 
of 60-65 kilometers, it is unlikely for two market locations to be efficient even when a price 
transmission analysis concludes to be so. Rashid (2004), which found Kampala and Masindi 
to be integrated, two market locations that are 220 kilometers apart. If the grain traders 
between Kampala and Masindi operate only within 60 kilometers, it would take several 
stops before maize from Masindi reach the country’s capital city Kampala, which is probably 
not efficient given the costs of loading and unloading.  
Table 1.  Characteristics of traders in Uganda 
Regions and 
Districts 
Years in  
agricultural 
trading 
Distance from trading premise to: 
Purchase markets 
(Kms) 
Sales markets 
(Kms) 
Central Region  6.22  74  35 
Eastern Region  6.31  55  45 
 Northern Region  5.95  50  84 
 Western Region  5.72  80  77 
 
The second set of data comes from a recent survey of grain traders in Ethiopia. Although the 
sampled traders were engaged primarily in trade in food grains, mainly maize, teff, and 
wheat. For a sample of recent transactions, the survey collected data on components of 
transactions costs, credits, and distance from purchase locations to sales locations  (see 
Table 2). Except for Addis Ababa, which included mainly retailers, the estimates tell the Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 7 
 
similar story as Uganda. The grain traders in Amhara, Oromya (merged with SNNP), and 
Tigray regions operate within a radius of 66 to 84 Kilometers, with Oromya and SNNP 
showing the largest trading radius. Thus, when we find market integration between Addis 
Ababa and Desse in the northern Ethiopia, which are more than 400 kilometers apart, it 
would be meaningless to assume direct trade and efficient arbitrage between the two 
locations. Yet, it is not uncommon to find these locations to be efficient in empirical market 
efficiency literature. For instance, Negassa and Myers (2007) finds Addis Ababa and Desse to 
be efficient (with more than 65 percent probability) after 1999; and Dercon (1995) finds 
integration between Addis and Dire Dawa, which is more than 500 kilometer to the east of 
Addis Ababa.   
 
Table 2.  Key indicators of grain trading activities in Ethiopia 
Trading Activities 
  Tigray  Amhara 
Oromya 
Dire Dawa 
Addis 
Ababa  Total 
Distance Traveled and Transaction Size        
Distance transported (km)   66.27  72.68  84.43  16.75  66.75 
Storage duration (days)  43.52  25.03  21.17  11.56  26.88 
Purchase lot size (tons)  5.20  6.42  8.03  6.17  6.52 
Sale lot size (tons)  3.93  5.37  6.87  5.51  5.44 
Transactions carried out through (%)         
Personal travel   23.77  20.54  32.09  1.59  22.02 
Purchase through intermediaries  54.04  36.84  31.54  6.25  35.82 
Sales through intermediary  5.65  6.35  24.22  1.59  10.12 
Number of observations  124  190  136  64  514 
Source: Authors’ construction based Gabre-Madhin and Negassa, 2004. 
 
A summary of the characteristics of each method of market integration is presented in Table 
3.  The older methods were not able to go beyond saying whether or not markets were 
integrated, and even in this task the results were biased when prices were non-stationary.  
Cointegration methods address the problem of non-stationarity, but do not take into 
account the fact that prices will be unconnected if the price differences is small enough.  
The newer methods, PBM and TAR,  can distinguish among equilibrium, autarky, and 
disequilibrium, but a number of questions remain unanswered. Even the new approaches 
cannot identify market inefficiency (unless transfer cost information is available) or the 
causal factors.  The discussion above clearly points to the fact that more detail data are 
needed  to better understand the agricultural markets of countries in Africa and other 
developing world. In particularly, there is a need for more detailed information on the size, 
composition, and variability in transfer costs between market pairs.   
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Table 3.  Characteristics of methods of analyzing market integration 
  Analytical method 
Characteristics  Correlation 
analysis 
Regression 
analysis 
without lags 
Regression 
analysis 
with lags 
Co- 
integration 
analysis 
Parity 
bounds 
method 
(PBM) 
Threshold 
auto-
regression  
(TAR) 
Measures co-
movement of 
prices 
Yes, but 
biased for 
non-
stationary 
variables 
Yes, but 
biased for 
non-
stationary 
variables 
Yes, but 
biased for 
non-
stationary 
variables 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Can include more 
than two markets 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Can measure 
speed of 
adjustment  
No  No  Yes  Yes  Only 
indirectly 
Yes  
Takes into account 
transfer costs 
No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Can make use of 
info on marketing 
costs 
No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Can identify 
market 
inefficiency and 
causes 
No   No  No  No  No, unless 
transfer 
costs 
available  
No, unless 
transfer 
costs 
available 
  
   Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 9 
 
 
3  Food market integration in sub-Saharan Africa  
Having established the strengths and weaknesses of market integration analysis, this section 
examines the empirical results of these studies in the analysis of stale food markets in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Below, we present the results of selected studies, organized by region.   
3.1  Western Africa 
Several studies of spatial market integration have been carried out in Ghana and Benin.  An 
early study of grain markets in Ghana used both the Ravallion model and cointegration 
methods to examine the relationships between maize, sorghum, and millet prices in three 
markets (Alderman, 1992).  The study uses monthly wholesale prices over the period 1970-
1990 in two markets: Techiman, a maize zone in the center, and Bolgatanga, a sorghum-
millet zone in the north.  The author finds that maize markets are relatively well integrated 
and that there are links between the markets for maize, sorghum, and millet.  On the other 
hand, the speed of transmission was rather slow, with full adjustment taking three months.  
Badiane and Shively (1998) examine the degree of integration and the speed of adjustment 
in Ghanaian maize prices.  The study uses monthly wholesale maize price data over the 
period 1980-1993 for three markets: Techiman, a surplus zone in the center, Accra, a deficit 
market in the south, and Bolangtanga, a maize-deficit market in the extreme north of the 
country.  The analysis is carried out with an autoregressive model in price levels, as well as a 
model of price variability.  The authors find that maize prices in both deficit markets are 
relatively well integrated with maize prices in Techiman, the surplus market.  However, the 
relationship is closer between Techiman and Accra than between Techiman and 
Bolangtanga, presumably due to the shorter distance between them.  Furthermore, they 
find that the economic reforms introduced in 1983, including agricultural market 
liberalization, reduced the level and volatility in maize prices in wholesale markets, though 
the degree of seasonality is still high.  
Abdulai (2000) uses a threshold cointegration model to examine the relationships among 
maize prices in the same three markets in Ghana.  The analysis uses monthly wholesale 
maize data over 1980-1997 for Accra, Techiman, and Bolgatanga.  The study finds that prices 
in Accra respond more quickly to changes in Techiman than do prices in Bolgatanga, 
reflecting the fact that Accra is closer and a more active market.  Half of the full adjustment 
in prices back to the long-run relationship occurs in 4-7 weeks.  In addition, the results 
indicate that an increase in the maize price in Techiman is more quickly transmitted to the 
two deficit markets than a decrease; in other words, the marketing margin is more quickly 
corrected when it is compressed than when it expands. This could occur as a result of 
collusion among traders, changes in inventory, and search costs.  Overall, the study finds 
that maize prices in different markets are relatively well integrated.  
Lutz et al (1994) examines the impact of agricultural market liberalization on maize price 
behavior in seven markets in Benin.  The data consist of maize prices from the seven 
markets at 4- and 7-day intervals over the periods 1987–9 and 1998–2001.  The seven 
markets include three urban centers (Cotonou, Parakou, and Bohicon) and four rural centers 
(Ketou, Glazoué, and Azové).  The Johansen rank test is used to identify the number of 
common trends found among the seven markets.  In the first period, all seven markets were 
cointegrated with each other, indicating that they followed a common trend.  In the second Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 10 
 
period, only six of the seven markets followed a common trend, the prices in Ketou not 
having a long-run relationship with prices in the other markets.  In addition, the study 
compares at the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium in the two periods.  It finds 
that there is no consistent pattern: the adjustment seems to be more rapid in the second 
period for some of the markets, but prices in Cotonou, Parakou, and Azové adjusted more 
slowly in the second period.  Overall, the authors conclude that the most of the markets in 
Benin are integrated in the sense that they follow a common trend, but there is no evidence 
of improvement in the degree of integration or the speed of adjustment to shocks.   
Kuiper et al (2003) focuses on the issue of price leadership between retail and wholesale 
prices in Benin in order to test the common assumption that retail prices follow the 
wholesale prices in the same market.  They use retail and wholesale price data from periodic 
markets operating every four day in five markets Cotonou, Bohicon, Azové, Dassa, and 
Kétou.  The tests for cointegration indicate that retail and wholesale prices are strongly co-
integrated.  The coefficient on the long-run relationship implies that retail prices are 2-18% 
above the wholesale price in the same city.  The study then examines whether wholesalers 
or retailers are “price leaders” using the Granger causality test.  It finds that in three of the 
four markets, the wholesale price in each period is significantly affected by the retail price in 
the previous period, but not the other way around. These markets include the two large 
urban areas: Cotonou and Bohicon.  In only two markets do wholesalers play a price leader 
role.  The authors interpret this to mean that wholesalers can only influence prices when 
they carry out inter-city trade and thus have alternatives to selling to retailers.   
3.2  Eastern Africa  
Ethiopia has been the subject of several market integration studies.  Dercon (1995) used 
cointegration analysis to examine the impact of market reforms on price transmission in 
markets for teff in Ethiopia. The analysis showed that the number of markets integrated 
with Addis Ababa increased following the reforms.  This suggests that the reforms had the 
effect of reducing marketing margins between Addis Ababa and teff surplus zones.   
Negassa (1998) uses various methods, including Granger causality analysis, to examine the 
relationships of teff, maize, and wheat prices across numerous markets in Ethiopia.  He tests 
for causality in 28 commodity-market-pair combinations.  In only one case was there no 
causation.  In 14 cases, there was two-way causation between the market price in Addis 
Ababa and the other market.  And in the remainder there was one-way causation.  Overall, 
the study concludes that there  were  “strong causal relationships”  between the cereal 
wholesale prices in Addis Ababa and those in other selected markets.  
Negassa and Meyers (2007) reexamine Ethiopian price data using an extended version of 
the parity bounds method (PBM).  It is extended to allow the probability of each type of 
regime to gradual change in response to changes in policy.  The model is tested on monthly 
data on wheat and maize prices in Ethiopia  during a period when the Ethiopian Grain 
Trading Enterprise was relieved of its responsibility to stabilize prices and made to operate 
as a commercial enterprise.  The policy change causes a statistically significant shift in the 
PBM parameters in only a few of the market pairs tested.  Maize markets were 
characterized by price differences below marketing costs even though flows were observed, 
suggesting trading losses.  In contrast, wheat price differences often exceeded transfer 
costs, implying excess profits.  Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 11 
 
Jaleta and Gebremedhin (2009) consider the relationship among wheat and teff prices in six 
market towns in Tigray region in northeast Ethiopia.  The analysis is carried out using semi-
monthly prices from May 2006 to October 2008.  The authors test the cointegration of 
wheat and teff prices for each of the 15 pairs of markets.  Wheat prices are cointegrated in 
13 of the 15 market pairs, indicating that they follow common trends.  Similarly, teff prices 
are cointegrated in 12 of the 15 market pairs.  The town of Abi Adi is the least integrated of 
the six towns, appearing in three of the six market pairs that were not cointegrated.  This is 
not surprising given that it is located more than 50 km from the nearest paved road; in 
contrast, four of the others are located on a paved road and the fifth is within 20 km.   
In a study of market integration in Uganda, Rashid (2004) examines the effect of market 
liberalization on maize price movement.  The study compares the behavior of maize prices 
before and after market liberalization which occurred in the mid-1990s.  The analysis is 
based on weekly maize price data for eight districts over 1993-94 and 1999-2001.  The 
analysis examines how many of the markets are co-integrated (that is, follow a common 
trend) in the two periods, as well as the direction of causality in pairs of markets.  The 
results indicate that market integration has improved markedly between the early 1990s 
and the end of the decade.  In 1993-94, only four of the eight markets were co-integrated, 
meaning that they followed a common trend.  In contrast, seven of the eight markets were 
following a common trend in the 1999-2001 periods.  At the same time, the maize markets 
in the northern districts of Gulu and Arua remain relatively disconnected from the other 
maize markets in the country.  This is explained by the insurgency in the north makes trade 
with the rest of the country both risky and costly. In addition, there cross-border trade 
between the northern districts of Uganda and southern Sudan, so that prices in the north 
reflect, to some degree, market conditions over the border. 
Van Campenhout (2007) analyzes the relationship between maize prices in seven markets in 
Tanzania using weekly price data over the period 1989-2000.  He uses a threshold auto-
regressive (TAR) model which allows pairs of prices to be linked only when the difference 
between them exceeds a threshold.  The study finds that the implied marketing cost is 2-
11% of the mean of the two prices, depending on the market pair being analyzed.   
Generally, the markets that are close to each other, such as Iringa and Mbeya, have a small 
threshold, while those that are farther, such as Iringa and Dar es Salaam, have a larger 
threshold.  The study measures the half-life of the adjustment process, that is, the number 
of weeks it takes for half of the full adjustment to take place.  Across the six pairs of markets 
analyzed, the half-life of adjustment was between 4 and 12 weeks.  The analysis also shows 
that the speed of adjustment has decreased over the 11-year period, the decline being 
statistically significant in four of the six market pairs.  In addition, the threshold decreased 8-
55%, implying a reduction in marketing costs between markets and a closer link between 
maize prices in different cities. 
3.3  Southern Africa  
In southern Africa, several studies have examined spatial market integration in Malawi.   
Goletti and Babu (1994) use cointegration methods to examine the behavior of maize prices 
in Malawi before and after market liberalizations.  They use monthly retail data for eight 
markets over the period 1984-1991.  They test the cointegration of each market pair.   
Before liberalization, 18 of the 48 market pairs were co-integrated, but after market 
liberalization 34 pairs were co-integrated.  This indicates that the market liberalization in Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 12 
 
1987 improved the transmission of price changes from one market to another.  On the other 
hand, they find that the transmission is only partial and can be slow.  The average 
adjustment to an initial shock took 5.7 months.  Finally, the study examines the symmetry of 
adjustment.  They find little evidence that price increases and price decreases are 
transmitted any differently in Malawi.   
Meyers (2008) provides a more recent study of maize markets in Malawi.  The analysis uses 
weekly maize prices from ten markets over the period 2001-2008, focusing on the 
difference in price within nine pairs of markets.  The price spreads are quite volatile and 
often turn negative, suggesting that the trade flows are not steady and that there may even 
be trade reversals.   The study finds strong evidence of a long-run relationship in six of the 
ten market pairs tested.  Half of the full adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium occurs 
within 1-2 weeks for all market pairs.  This adjustment is more rapid than estimated by 
earlier studies of Malawi maize markets by Goletti and Babu (1994) and Chirwa (2000), 
suggesting an improvement in market efficiency over time.  It is also comparable to the 
speed of adjustment of maize and soybean markets in the United States, estimated to range 
between 0.2 and 3 weeks (Goodwin and Piggot, 2001).  The estimated threshold above 
which price transmission occurs ranged from 0.5 Malawi kwacha/kg to 6.4 MK/kg across the 
nine market pairs studied, equivalent to US$ 5 to 61 per ton at December 2004 exchange 
rates. For most of the pairs, the threshold estimates appear to correspond with estimates of 
the marketing cost, but for two pairs, the threshold seem to large given the short distance 
between the markets.   
Tostao and Brorsen (2005) examine market integration in Mozambique using monthly retail 
prices of maize over 1994-2001 and estimates of transfer costs.  They use the parity bounds 
method (PBM) which distinguishes among three regimes: competitive trade (when the price 
difference is equal to the transfer cost), non-trading markets (when the price differences is 
smaller than the transfer cost), and disequilibrium (when the price difference exceeds 
transfer cost).  A measure of the level of the integration of a market pair is the proportion of 
the time they are in the first two regimes.  The results suggest that markets within southern 
Mozambique are efficient (by this definition) 55% of the time, while those in central 
Mozambique are efficient 84% of the time.  Southern and central Mozambique are relatively 
well integrated, but the transfer costs between northern Mozambique and the rest of the 
country are too high to justify maize trade.  These findings are supported by data that 
indicate maize trade flows within southern and central Mozambique, but little trade 
between northern Mozambique and the rest of the country.  A vector-autoregression (VAR) 
analysis confirmed that prices in each of the six main markets were linked to prices in one or 
two of the other markets.  
Moser, Barrett, and Minten (2009) examine rice markets in Madagascar using four quarters 
of data on prices and transportation cost for almost 1400 communes.  They apply the parity 
bounds model which distinguishes among the three trading regimes, as described above.  At 
the sub-regional level, 69% of the communes appear to be in competitive trading markets, 
21% are in non-trading (or segmented) markets, and 10% are in disequilibrium.  At the 
regional and national level, however, markets are more likely to be either segmented (due 
to high transportation costs) or in disequilibrium, possibly indicating imperfect competition.   
Finally, in one of the few studies that examines cross-border market integration in Africa, 
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market integration among five southern African countries: Botswana (Gaborone), South 
Africa (Gauteng), Malawi (Blantyre), northern Mozambique (Mocuba) and southern 
Mozambique (Maputo).  The PBM is extended by using outside estimates of transfer costs 
and trade flows among the five markets.  The model distinguishes among six regimes: each 
of the three PBM regimes with or without trade.  The results suggest that there is trade 
from South Africa to Botswana, though price differences often exceed estimated transfer 
costs most of the time.  A very similar pattern is observed in trade from South Africa to 
southern Mozambique and from northern Mozambique to Malawi. Finally, about half the 
time, the price in southern Mozambique is high enough to justify transporting maize from 
northern Mozambique, but this trade does not occur.  In each of these cases, the reverse 
flow is unprofitable and rarely occurs.  Overall, trade flows are predictable based on price 
differences, but either transfer costs are underestimated or trade is sub-optimal.  One 
possibility is that estimated transfer costs exclude (or underestimate) the profit and risk 
premia necessary to motivate long-distance cross-border trade.  
3.4  Summary 
Overall, these studies suggest that markets function relatively well, following the rules of 
spatial arbitrage in the long run but with significant deviations in the short run.  Market 
integration breaks down when markets are separated by long distances and poor 
infrastructure, though this does not necessarily indicate imperfect competition in food 
markets.    
Economic theory and the empirical evidence indicate that marketing costs (or transfer costs) 
play a critical role in the spatial patterns in staple food prices. In the next section, we 
examine some of the evidence regarding marketing costs in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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4  Marketing costs in sub-Saharan Africa 
This section examines the cost of transporting staple foods between markets in Africa, the 
trends in these marketing costs, and the factors that influence the size of marketing costs.   
4.1  Comparison of marketing costs in Africa  
A recent study by the World Bank demonstrates that the average cost of transportation 
tends to considerably higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions.  As shown in Table 
4, the cost of long-distance transportation in sub-Saharan Africa ranges between US$ 0.06 
and US$ 0.11 per kilometer-ton, compare to rates of US$ 0.02-0.05 per km-ton in other 
regions.  Because of low wages, the daily labor component of transportation costs in Africa 
are low by international standards.  However, this is more than offset by higher fuel costs, 
higher fuel consumption, and higher maintenance costs.  The higher fuel consumption and 
higher maintenance costs are both the result of the fact that trucks tend to be older and the 
roads in poorer condition in sub-Saharan Africa (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009).   
Table 4.  Cost of long-distance transportation 
Location  Cost (US$ 
per km-ton) 
Pakistan  0.02 
Brazil  0.03 
United States  0.04 
China  0.05 
France  0.05 
Durban-Lusaka  0.06 
Lome-Ouagadougou  0.07 
Mombasa-Kampala  0.08 
Douala-N’Djamena  0.11 
 Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009 
 
A trucker survey carried out as part of the study revealed that variable costs represent two-
thirds to three-quarters of total cost of road transport.  Of variable costs, fuel is the most 
important category, representing 50-80% of variable costs in most countries, followed by 
tires (10-40%).  The costs of bribery were relatively low in East and southern Africa (0-2%), 
but much higher in western Africa (6%) and central Africa (12-27%).  Among the fixed costs, 
labor and depreciation were the main components
8
Another study examining the cost of agricultural marketing in eastern Africa estimated the 
cost of marketing over shorter distances, including from the farm to local markets (World 
Bank, 2009).  The results, shown in 
 
Table 5, indicate that short-distance marketing has a 
much higher cost on a per kilometer-ton basis.  The marketing cost between secondary and 
wholesale markets was US$ 0.11 to US$ 0.18 per km-ton, while the cost from the farm-gate 
to the local market was US$ 0.30 to 1.50 per km-ton.  The higher cost of short-distance 
marketing is presumably related to the use of smaller vehicles on poorer roads.   
                                                      
8  Labor and depreciation were classified as “fixed” costs because they do not vary with the distance traveled, 
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The market integration study by Tostao and Brorsen (2005) made use of estimated 
marketing costs between various pairs of main markets in Mozambique.  The marketing 
costs between the 24 market pairs were in the range of US$ 0.02 to US$ 0.10 per km-ton, 
depending largely on the quality of the road.  The average cost across all market pairs was 
US$ 0.07 per km-ton.  
Finally, a study of the transport sector in Tanzania estimated the cost for international road 
shipments to be US$ 0.06 to US$ 0.085 per km-ton and US$ 0.03 to US$ 0.04 per km-ton for 
domestic shipments (Meeuws, 2004).   
 
Table 5.  Grain marketing costs in selected countries 
Countries / Indicators 
Farm gate to 
primary 
Primary- 
secondary  
Secondary- 
wholesale 
 
Total or 
average 
     Ethiopia 
     
 
 
Distance travelled (km)  28.48  61.32  67.76  158.0 
 
Transport cost (US$/km-mt)  0.30  0.20  0.18  0.15 
 
 Transport as % of total   15%  17%  30%  -- 
    Kenya 
     
 
 
Distance travelled (km)  6  67  300  373.0 
 
Transport cost (US$/km-mt)  0.30  0.30  0.11  0.15 
 
 Transport as % of total   19%  65%  39%  -- 
    Tanzania 
     
 
 
Distance travelled (km)  3  50  80  461.0 
 
Transport cost (US$/km-mt)  0.40  0.27  0.12  0.16 
 
 Transport as % of total   94%  77%  45%  -- 
    Uganda 
     
 
 
Distance travelled (km)  16  100  345  133.0 
 
Transport cost (US$/km/mt)  1.5  0.33  0.15  0.25 
 
 Transport as % of total   60%  79%  46%  -- 
Source: Ethiopia numbers are from Rashid and Negassa (2009) and the other country numbers are computed 
from World Bank (2009). 
 
4.2  Trends in marketing costs 
What are the trends in marketing costs in sub-Saharan Africa?  It is difficult to generalize 
because of the diversity of experience, but there are a number of studies suggesting that 
marketing margins have declined. 
A dramatic example is provided by the cost of shipping freight from Mombasa to Kigali.  The 
cost was more than US$ 700 per ton in 1990 (in 2009 dollars) but declined to less than US$    
100 per ton in 2006.  Much of the decline occurred between 1993 and 1995 as a result of 
deregulation.  Before 1994, STIR, a parastatal trucking company had a monopoly on long-
distance road transport.  After the war ended, the trucking industry was deregulated, 
leading to a rapid recovery in the size of the fleet as well as a sharp reduction in transport 
costs (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009).  
Tostao and Brorsen (2005) note that the road network has recently been improved between 
Maputo and Chimoio and between Maputo and Maxixe.  They use this fact to explain the Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 16 
 
low level of efficiency in those market pairs, since the PBM was comparing price differences 
over 1994-2001 and the marketing cost in 2001. Since the (older) price differences were 
larger than the (recent) marketing cost, giving the misleading impression that the markets 
were not efficient.  
In addition, a number of market integration studies indicate an increase in the number of 
integrated market pairs and/or a reduction in time required for one market to adjust to 
price changes in another market.  As mentioned above in section 3: 
•  In Malawi, Goletti and Babu (1994) found an increase in the number of market pairs 
that were integrated increased between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s.  
•  In Tanzania, Van Campenhout (2007) found speed of adjustment of maize prices in 
one market to changes in maize prices in other markets increased over the 1990s, 
the increase being statistically significant in four of the six market pairs.  In addition, 
the threshold decreased 8-55%, implying a reduction in marketing costs between 
markets and a closer link between maize prices in different cities. 
•  In Uganda, Rashid (2004) found  that the number of market pairs that were 
integrated increased markedly between 1993-94 and 1999-2001.   
•  And in Ethiopia, Negassa and Jayne (1997) examine the price margins between pairs 
of markets in Ethiopia before and after liberalization.  They find that grain price 
differences decreased in 23 of 24 market pairs examined. Dercon (1995) comes to a 
similar conclusion using cointegration analysis.  
Of the studies reviewed here, only two found no significant change during a period of 
market liberalization, a study of Benin by Lutz et al. (1994) and one of Ethiopia by Negassa 
and Meyers (2007).   
In summary, there is fragmentary but widespread evidence that marketing costs and price 
margins have declined in sub-Saharan Africa over the past few decades.  This is the result of 
road building and improvement projects, reduction in barriers to cross-border trade, and 
deregulation of agricultural marketing and the transport sector as part of economic reforms. 
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5  Determinants of market efficiency 
Price-based market integration analyses essentially assume a given state of the market 
fundamentals—such as infrastructure, information, institutions, and policies—that 
facilitates market exchanges. Transactions costs associated with these market fundamentals 
are the key determinants of market efficiency. We present some empirics on the 
determinants of market efficiency under the three subsections below. 
5.1  Infrastructure  
As already mentioned, the market is a complex institution and its performance depends on 
numerous factors.  One of the most important factors is the quality of transportation 
infrastructure.  Teravaninthon and Raballand (2009) list the ways that poor roads increase 
transport costs: higher fuel consumption, higher maintenance costs, faster depreciation of 
vehicles, tire replacement costs, and lost time due to lower speeds.  Several studies have 
quantified the effect of road quality on transport costs and market integration.  Loveridge 
(1991) showed that a road improvement project in southwestern Rwanda reduced price 
differences between two markets and increased the correlation of their prices over time.  
Minten and Kyle (1999) found that the cost of transportation was twice as high on poor 
roads compared to paved roads in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). The 
higher cost of transport on poor roads resulted in lower prices received by farmers selling 
their crops.  
Naturally, the higher cost of transport associated with poor roads reduces the volume of 
trade and eventually household income. Buys et al (2006) uses a gravity model to predict 
the level of trade among African countries as a function of distance, road quality (as 
measured by the percentage of roads paved), membership in regional agreements, and 
other factors.  The results indicate that a 1% increase in road quality leads to a 2% increase 
in trade between countries. Simulations revealed that increasing road quality across sub-
Saharan Africa could expand international trade from US$ 10 billion to US$ 29 billion per 
year.  Coulibaly and Fontagné (2004) use a similar gravity model on western African data 
and also find a significant effect of road quality on trade volume.        
5.2  Institutions and information  
One component of marketing costs is transaction costs: the cost of finding a buyer or seller, 
negotiating the transaction, carrying out the exchange, and enforcing the terms of the 
transaction.  Institutions and information are two key determinants of transaction costs and 
thus market efficiency. Personalized market transactions take place due to incomplete or 
missing institutions. In the presence of functioning institutions strong governance, 
transactions are impersonal and rules of the game are self-enforcing. And information is 
critical for locating a buyer/seller and settling on a price. If prices in large terminal markets 
are known to the farmers and small traders, it will increase their bargaining power and 
increase their shares in the value chain, reducing the possibility of market manipulation by a 
few and enhancing overall market efficiency.   
The rapid expansion in the use of mobile phones in sub-Saharan Africa creates an 
opportunity to measure the impact of improved market information on marketing margins. 
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impact. She estimates that mobile phone usage reduced the grain price spread between 
markets by at least 6.4% and reduced inter-seasonal price differences by 10%.  Furthermore, 
the effects of mobile phone use was greater in more remote areas and areas with poor 
roads.   
Another determinant of marketing costs is the effectiveness of the legal system in resolving 
commercial disputes. Table 6 shows three indicators of contract enforcement: processes 
involved in resolving disputes, number of days it takes to settle a dispute, the cost of dispute 
settlement as percentage of debt recovered. These data are compiled for the formal and 
registered companies or agencies in the respective countries and hence are not really 
representative of the staple food markets, where transactions are largely informal.   
However, despite this caveat, the numbers show broad patterns, as well the complications 
of contract enforcement in each of these countries. In terms of the number of procedures, 
these countries are not much different from the OECD countries. However, in terms of times 
the African countries take to settle a dispute is much longer and the costs of recovering 
debts are much higher. In Ghana, it takes more than two years to settle and in Malawi, a 
company has to spend almost 36 percent more than what it recovers after a dispute is 
settled. If this is the state of contract enforcement in formal private sector, one can imagine 
the risks of a typical maize trader whose transactions are largely informal.  
Table 6.  Indicators of contract enforcement efficiency in African countries 
Indicators  Ethiopia  Ghana  Kenya  Malawi  Zambia  Uganda  OECD 
No. of Procedures  30  22  25  40  21  19  22 
Days to process  690  730  360  337  404  484  252 
Cost as % of debt 
recovered 
14.8  12.7  41.3  136.5  28.7  35.2  11.2 
Source: World Bank, 2009.  
Note: Numbers are for 2006 or most recent year. 
In fact, the absence of the formal contract enforcement options is probably one of the main 
reasons that transactions are personalized and credit markets are so thin for staple food 
marketing in these countries.  
5.3  Competition 
Markets work best in generating optimal
9
                                                      
9   In this sense, optimal refers to Pareto optimality, in which no one could be made better off without making 
someone worse off.  It does not imply a broader social optimality of the outcome, taking distributional issues 
into account. 
 outcomes when they are competitive, meaning 
that there are many buyers and sellers, none of which is large enough to affect the market 
price.  Although it is widely believed in developing countries that “middle-men” are able to 
earn excessive profits through market power, few studies have been able to demonstrate 
market power in domestic grain markets in sub-Saharan Africa.  As mentioned above, 
Abdulai (2000) found asymmetry in price transmission in Ghana, suggesting some market 
power, but Goletti and Babu (1994) did not find this asymmetry in Malawi.  Osborne (2005) 
used transaction level data from Ethiopia to test for imperfect competition.  She found 
evidence of imperfect competition among wholesalers in smaller markets that were isolated 
from the main cities, but no evidence in the larger markets.  Even so, the impact of the Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 19 
 
imperfect competition in the smaller markets was modest, reducing producer prices by just 
3%.    
Estimates from the Uganda grain traders’ survey are presented in Table 7, which shows the 
average number of years in trading, changes in the level of competition over time, and the 
percentage of transactions on credit.  Two points from this table deserve highlighting. First, 
only a small percentage of traders in the district towns of Uganda carry out transactions on 
credit, suggesting that credit is a risky business for the grain traders. As a result, the traders 
engage in credit transactions only if the trade partners are known to each other and there 
are social networks that can help settle dispute or renegotiate contract terms. Second, 
although the level of competition is increasing, grain markets are still thin. Consider the case 
of Masindi, a large maize growing district, where an average maize trader had been in 
business only for about 2.5 years; and only 32 traders operated in the markets. Thus, one 
can argue that, although there are price transmissions across market locations, there is still 
much to be done to increase competition and market efficiency. 
 
Table 7.  Competition and credit relationship in Ugandan maize markets 
 
Regions and 
Districts 
 
Years in the  
agricultural  
trading  
Number of competitors   
Percent of 
transactions on 
credit 
When started 
business 
In the year 
2000 
Central Region         
Kampala  5.1  59  109  34 
Luwero  6.5  84  49  22 
Masaka  5.3  37  55  28 
Mpigi  6.7  30  40  18 
Mukono  7.6  55  42  24 
Eastern Region             
Busia  3.0  7  50  45 
Iganga  6.3  70  119  14 
Jinja  9.0  91  193  15 
Kamuli  6.8  15  26  21 
Mbale  7.5  34  106  17 
Pallisa  5.2  36  80  16 
Tororo  5.6  46  90  14 
Northern Region             
Apac  4.5  15  32  6 
Arua  4.1  13  25  18 
Lira  11.7  24  97  19 
Gulu  6.7  9  12  13 
Kitgum  2.8  19  21  20 
Nebbi  4.5  37  81  25 
Pader  0.0  30  30   
Western Region             
Bushenyi  3.9  105  150  12 
Kabale  8.2  24  22  29 
Kabarole  4.1  14  21  30 
Kasese  9.4  24  44  28 
Masindi  2.6  26  32  18 
Mbarara  6.8  11  16  26 
Rukungiri  9.3  49  43  1 
Source: Rashid (2004) based on IFPRI agricultural market survey 2000-2002 Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 20 
 
 
A study of the transport sector in eastern Africa revealed a wide variety of freight rates, 
both across and within countries (Anyango, 1997).  The cost for domestic truck transport 
between cities ranges from US$ 0.08-0.12 per km-ton in Kenya, US$ 0.09-0.16 per km-ton in 
Uganda, and US$ 0.13-0.19 per km-ton.  The report argues that freight rates are determined 
more by level of truck and rail competition and the availability of backhaul than by distance.  
It also attributes the lower rates in Kenya to more intense competition.  
In summary, there is some evidence that large city markets are more competitive and 
efficient than small markets, and that marketing costs are lower in areas with dense 
demand for transport services compared to remote areas where demand is less dense.  
5.4  Policy induced factors 
Public policies directly and indirectly affect staple food market performance. Examples 
include regulation of transport and agricultural marketing, price stabilization and buffer 
stock policies, trade policy, and macroeconomic policy.  In this section, we discuss the links 
between such policies and market performance. 
  Regulation of transport sector 
In extreme cases, a parastatal trucking enterprise maintains a legal monopoly over road 
transport.  This was the case in Rwanda before 1994, as discussed above, and resulted in 
very high transport costs.  Following the economic reforms in many African counties in the 
1980s and 1990s, this is much less common than it used to be.   
In other cases, freight rates are regulated by a government body.  Often these regulatory 
bodies are “captured” by the industry they regulate, and set shipping rates above market 
rates.  According to Teravaninthon and Raballand (2009), regulated shipping rates are not 
common in East and southern Africa but are still used in some countries of western and 
central Africa.    
Another common type of regulation are rules that favor the domestic trucking industry over 
transport companies from other countries.  In severe cases, this type of regulation can force 
trucks to unload their product at the border and have it reloaded onto local trucks on the 
other side.  More commonly, these regulations increase the administrative burden 
associated with crossing international borders.  Recently, an African business association 
prepared a set of recommendations for lowering transport costs.  It proposed a common 
truck license for the different regional associations in sub-Saharan Africa and a reduction of 
the fees imposed on trucks from other countries (ESABMO, 2008). 
In addition, the practice of setting up check-points can contribute to higher marketing costs.  
According to one study, checkpoints and border controls added four to seven days to the 
three-day trip between Douala (Cameroon) and Bangui  (Central African Republic).   
Furthermore, a loaded truck pays a total of US$ 580 in fees (formal and informal) to make 
this route.  Another study found up to seven checkpoints per 100 km of road in some 
western African countries (Buys et al, 2006). 
Teravaninthon and Raballand (2009) argue that administrative costs and delays are a larger 
contributor to high marketing costs in sub-Saharan Africa than poor road quality, 
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administrative procedures and deregulation would be, in the medium term, a more effective 
way to reduce marketing costs than road improvement.  
Public interventions in staple food markets 
Governments in many African countries continue to intervene heavily in their grain markets. 
These interventions are carried out by state enterprises such as the Ethiopia Grain Trading 
Enterprise (EGTE), the National Cereals and Produce  Board (NCPB) of Kenya, the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) in Malawi, and the Food 
Reserve Agency in Zambia.  Typically, they maintain grain stocks for emergency use, attempt 
to stabilize grain prices, and provide grain to remote deficit areas (see Table 8).  Purchases 
by these grain trading state enterprises have  been  an estimated 15-57 percent of the 
domestic marketed maize output in Kenya, 3-32 percent in Malawi, and 12-70 percent in 
Zambia (Jayne and Tshirley, 2009). 
Table 8.  Summary of government interventions in staple food markets 
Country  Summary of interventions in food markets 
Ethiopia  Level of interventions has increased in recent years. Maintained a strategic reserves of 430 
thousand tons; large emergency operation, large food aid inflow 
Kenya   Food logistic agency (NCPB) is a dominant player in maize markets, capturing 10-20% of 
marketed maize. Price setting is unpredictable—sometimes NCPB prices are above import 
parity and sometimes they’re lower than domestic market and government has to force 
farmers to sell.  Frequent changes in import tariff rates through the port of Mombasa. 
Malawi  Has active food logistic agency (ADMARC), a strategic grain reserve programs, and 
discussion underway to intensify interventions (more details later).  Maize export bans and 
periodic waivers of the import tariff are common.  Malawi banned private trade in August 
of 2008 and then imposed fixed buying and selling prices on the private sector in 
September 2008.  
Mozambique  Low level of government intervention in staple food markets. No active market 
participation in buying or selling; no price mandates; trade (imports and exports) 
encouraged usually (some exceptions). WFP Purchase for Progress is active in maize and 
beans, in addition to other WFP local purchase activities.  import tariff of 17-20% on 
imported maize, which can be rebated if the buyer mills the grain directly but doesn't resell 
the grain. 
Uganda  Government intervention is low. However, WFP purchase under LRP is high—some years 
exceeding more than 15 percent of total maize production in the country.  
Tanzania  Relatively little intervention in domestic staple food markets.  Strategic Grain Reserve has 
capacity for 150 thousand tons, but usually buys and sells much smaller quantities. Maize 
can be exported, particularly to the south, but maize exports are banned when there is food 
insecurity in the country, which is often. 
Zambia  Zambia's Food Reserve Agency (FRA) is the single largest players in the country's domestic 
maize market, purchasing 25% of national production and over 90% of smallholder 
marketed volumes since 2006.  The Zambian government controls trade in maize and wheat 
through a system of quantitative restrictions regulated under the Control of Goods Act.  
Both imports and exports require government permits stipulating the allowable quantities 
traded.  In recent years, the Food Reserve Agency has received the bulk of the trading 
permits for both the import and export of maize.   Export bans and periodic waivers of the 
import tariff are common. Inter-district taxes on grain movement was officially abolished 
earlier in 2009 
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If these interventions are driven by political economy considerations rather than policy 
rationale, such as addressing market failures, the likely outcome is reduced market 
efficiency. However, these state grain trading enterprises generally operate in competition 
with private traders, and the state enterprises do not have a large enough market share to 
fix prices.  Thus, staple food prices rise and fall largely as a result of market conditions, and 
studies indicate that market integration still occurs.  However, government intervention can 
and does have a short-term impact on grain prices and can introduce considerable 
uncertainty for private traders. 
ADMARC is  one of the more active grain trading enterprises, though its influence and 
activities in Malawi have waned over the past ten years. Using weekly maize price data in 
ten markets locations during 2001-2008, a recent study concludes that there has been an 
improved in maize market efficiency in the country, as indicated by more rapid adjustment.  
In response to the food crisis, the government severely restricted private trade in maize in 
August 2008, but this was too recent to be picked up by the analysis  (Myers, 2008).  
Similarly,  Ethiopia had received roughly 700 thousand tons of food aid per year during 
1995/96 to 2004/05. Simple calculations suggest that this amount of food aid inflow could 
depress domestic prices of wheat between 13 to 26 percent depending on the assumption 
about price elasticity (Rashid, et al., 2009). Yet, empirical market integration analyses with 
data from the same period suggest that market pairs such as Addis Ababa-Nekampt (327 Km 
apart) and Dire Dawa-Shashamene (572 Km apart) are efficient (Negassa and Myers, 2007).  
Another study found that markets in Addis Ababa and Jimma (346 Km apart) are integrated, 
as are those in Addis Ababa and Shashamene (275 Km apart) (Rashid and Gabre-Madhin, 
2008).  
Macroeconomic and Trade Policies 
Both macroeconomic and trade policies of a nation can directly affect staple food markets. 
The example of Ethiopia  demonstrates  how macroeconomic policy misalignment can 
destabilize cereal markets. With trade, the import parity price serves as an upper bound for 
domestic prices. If domestic prices go above it, this will induce imports which will push 
domestic prices down. On the other hand, if domestic prices remain below import parity 
and above export parity, there will be no international trade of that commodity. Figure 2 
shows that domestic wheat prices, which have historically been around or below import 
parity, shot up in the middle of 2009 and remain above import parity. In June-July of 2008, 
the domestic price of wheat was more than US$ 200 per ton above import parity, meaning 
that a private trader could make a US$ 200 per ton profit on importing. Why, then, didn’t 
private traders import?  The reason is that, in early 2008, the high cost of fuel imports led to 
a balance of payments crisis
10
   
. Rather than allowing the currency to depreciate, the 
government chose to ration foreign currency.  Therefore, grain imports were being carried 
out through the Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), and food aid grain by World 
Food Programme. 
                                                      
10 Ethiopia did not increase domestic gasoline prices even when world price hit US$147 a barrel. As a 
result subsidy bills reached roughly US$700 million.   Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 23 
 
  
Figure 2: Effect of macroeconomic policy on wheat prices in Ethiopia  
 
 
A second example is the 2001-03 food crisis in Malawi.  ADMARC had just sold off most of its 
stock when it became apparent that the next harvest would be poor.  The private sector was 
reluctant to import maize in the belief that ADMARC would soon do so and would sell the 
maize at a subsidized price.  The government delayed importing maize, initially in the belief 
that the shortage was not serious.  By the time the import order was placed, the domestic 
price of maize had spiked far above the import parity price (Jayne et al, 2005).  This example 
illustrates the effect of government involvement in international trade in reducing or 
eliminating the incentives for the private sector to trade.   
Another example is the East African Community (EAC). Despite the declarations of reducing 
trade barriers and implementing a policy of “maize without borders,” EAC member 
countries often adopt trade-impeding policies. Tanzania has followed a practice of banning 
food exports following poor harvest to ensure that local supplies go to deficit areas within 
the country. Kenya maintains high import duties on maize from outside the EAC, and has 
imposed temporary restrictions on maize imports from EAC countries to protect its farmers. 
And the most liberalized country in the region, Uganda, has had serious problems with 
maize market collapse in early 2000. After two consecutive years of good harvests, Uganda 
accumulated a large maize surplus in 2001. However, due to an import ban in Kenya and 
reduced procurement by WFP, maize markets collapsed and prices in Kampala dropped to 
as low as US$ 50 per metric tons  in August 2001. When prices go that low, surplus farmers 
and traders face serious hardships. The government of Uganda invited several heads of the 
states to discuss how to deal with the situation, which resulted in averting the crisis by 
exporting about 40 thousand tons of maize to Zambia under a government backed credit 
guarantee scheme (Minot and Rashid, 2008).   
Jayne et al (2005) list a number of interventions in maize markets by the government that 
raise costs and risks for private trade, potentially increasing the volatility of food prices. 
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•  Maize export bans, implemented by Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania, among others, at 
different times.   
•  Unpredictable changes in import tariffs, including cases in which the maize import 
tariff was changed just for a few days.   
•  Government importation of food and sale to selected buyers. 
•  Import licenses required for cross-border trade, which can be a significant 
administrative burden since the licenses usually must be obtained in the capital city. 
Thus, food marketing costs are influenced by a range of factors including the quality of 
transportation infrastructure, access to market information, regulation of agricultural 
marketing and transport, government intervention in food markets, macroeconomic policy 
(particularly related to availability of foreign exchange), and trade policy.  Unpredictable 
changes in policy are particularly harmful because they raise the cost of doing business for 
traders, which is eventually reflected in the lower prices in surplus regions and higher prices 
in deficit areas.  
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6  Summary and implications 
6.1  Summary 
Market integration refers to the co-movement of prices in markets and/or flows between 
them.  This may refer to two levels in the same supply chain (vertical integration) or two 
locations for the same commodity (spatial integration). In contrast, market efficiency refers 
to minimizing cost and not leaving any opportunities for mutually beneficial trade 
unexploited.   
It is possible for efficient markets not to be integrated if the price difference between the 
two markets is less than the marketing cost between them.  In other words, segmented 
markets may well be efficient.  At the same time, spatially integrated markets may not be 
efficient if marketing costs are higher than normal due to imperfect competition, lack of 
information, or other reasons.  A special case of this is when trade is fragmented into 
numerous short segments with the commodity changing hands several time.  This could 
occur due to limited access to credit, social capital, or language differences.   
The methods for measuring market integration have improved over time, taking into 
account exogenous factors, lagged effects, and the problem of non-stationary variables.  
Cointegration analysis takes non-stationary into account and allows measurement of the 
long-run relationship and the speed of adjustment, but it does not distinguish between lack 
of integration because of market inefficiency and lack of integration because the price 
difference is too small.  Threshold autoregression (TAR) and the parity bound method (PBM) 
address this problem, particularly if outside information on transfer costs can be obtained.  
Based on our review of studies of the spatial integration of food markets in sub-Saharan 
Africa, we can draw four conclusions: 
•  Food grains prices in most of the markets within each country are co-integrated, though 
the degree of integration varies with distance and road quality. Markets that are not co-
integrated are usually those that are more remote or off the main roads.  
•  The speed of adjustment varies widely across studies, ranging from just one week to six 
months.  However, recent studies that use weekly price data indicate that half of the full 
adjustment takes place within 1-4 weeks.   
•  There is no consensus on the symmetry of price transmission.  Abdulai (2000) found 
asymmetry in Ghana, possibly indicating trader collusion, but Goletti and Babu (1994) 
found symmetric price transmission in Malawi.   
•  Most of the studies that examine the impact of market liberalization find statistically 
significant evidence of improved market integration after reforms.  The exception 
(Benin) represents a case in which pre-reform food markets were not heavily regulated. 
The cost of transport is significantly higher in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere, due to a 
combination of poor roads, high fuel prices, and administrative procedures which cause 
delays.  The cost is US$ 0.04 - 0.10 per km-ton for long-distance road transport and US$ 0.10 
- 0.40 per km-ton for shorter-distance, lower-volume transport.  In contrast, the cost of road 
transport is US$ 0.03 - 0.04 in Pakistan and OECD countries.  Transport costs vary widely Spatial price variation in sub-Saharan Africa  Page 26 
 
within Africa as well, being lowest in southern Africa and highest in western and central 
Africa. 
There is fragmentary but widespread evidence that transport costs have declined over the 
past decade due to market liberalization, infrastructure investments, and better access to 
information thanks to mobile phones. 
The efficiency of food markets is affected by a variety of factors: 
•  Barriers to trade in agriculture.  District-level taxes, check points, tariffs, and non-tariff 
barriers to trade raise the cost of food to remote deficit areas and landlocked countries. 
•  Degree of competition in the transport sector.  Countries and areas within countries 
with less dense demand for transport services tend to have lower transport costs, due in 
part to lower competition. 
•  Access to information. Although difficult to measure, one study showed that the 
adoption of mobile phones cut spatial price margins by 6%.                             
•  Effectiveness of the legal system.  The difficulty of enforcing contracts in developing 
countries  results in additional marketing costs as traders personally inspect their 
purchases and carry out face-to-face transactions.  
•  Quality of transport infrastructure.  Studies show that poor-quality roads can double the 
cost of transportation, reduce trade volumes, and reduce the prices farmers receive. 
•  Regulation of the transport sector.  Marketing costs are generally increased by state 
transportation monopolies, administratively-set  freight rates, regulations favoring 
domestic transporters, and the proliferation of check points.  
•  Government interventions in food markets.  Pubic stocks are necessary to meet 
emergency needs, but unpredictable purchases and sales by the government introduce 
uncertainty into grain markets, raising costs and often increasing price volatility.   
•  Trade and macroeconomic policy. Grain prices have spiked above import parity due to 
foreign exchange controls, high tariffs, and uncertainty about public-sector import 
intentions.   
Overall, it appears that grain markets are reasonably efficient given the difficult 
environment in which they operate, but they are constrained by poor infrastructure, 
administrative and tariff barriers, a high degree of risk and uncertainty, and limited 
information.  In some cases, price differences may be significantly higher than transfer costs, 
particularly in remote areas, but the best way to reduce margins is to address the root 
causes (poor infrastructure, risk, and lack of information) rather than by regulating prices or 
having state enterprises compete with traders. 
6.2  Implications for policy  
From the results summarized above, what can we conclude about the types of policies and 
investments that will make agricultural markets more efficient?  It should be noted that 
none of the studies reviewed provide a cost-benefit analysis that would be needed to 
demonstrate beyond a doubt the value of these measures.  However, they do provide 
information on the types of policies that would reduce marketing costs and further 
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•  Continue the process of agricultural market liberalization.  Five of the seven studies 
examining this issue concluded that agricultural market liberalization had improved 
spatial market integration or reduced marketing margins.   
•   Streamline administrative border procedures.  One of the most comprehensive studies 
of the transport sector in sub-Saharan Africa concluded that administrative barriers are 
at least as important an obstacle as poor roads, particularly in western and central 
Africa.  One such step would be to explore the feasibility of regional or continent-wide 
uniform truck registration. 
•  Promote competition in the transport industries.  Marketing costs are lower in countries 
and regions where the  demand for transport services  is dense, leading to more 
competition. Competition can be promoted by reducing administrative and regulatory 
barriers to entry into the transport industry and eliminating protection for local trucking 
companies. 
•  Improve market information, particularly with the use of information and 
communication technology. Strong evidence from Niger suggests that mobile phones 
can improve market efficiency, and economic theory favors subsidizing the provision of 
public goods such as market information.  
•  Strengthen institutions that facilitate contract enforcement. The objective could be 
pursued by a) establishing small-claims courts, b) establishing a commercial code of 
conduct and peer-review mechanisms, or c) promoting mediation through trader 
associations. 
•  Improve transportation infrastructure.  This is less important where there are still high 
administrative and policy barriers to trade, but becomes more important as these 
barriers are reduced or eliminated.  
•  Make government intervention in staple food markets predictable and modest.  Any 
government intervention creates some uncertainty, but this can be minimized by 
adopting rule-based interventions, such as price-triggers for purchase and sale 
operations.  Transparency about public stocks and planned interventions would also be 
useful. 
•  Reduce barriers to international and cross-border grain imports.  Sharp price hikes in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi could have been avoided by reducing barriers to food 
imports by private traders.    
•  Seek regional agreements to limit food export bans.  Many African countries 
implemented food export bans during the 2007-08 food crisis.  These policies were not 
successful in keeping food prices down and exacerbated the crisis in landlocked 
countries.  Although it is politically  difficult for an individual country to allow food 
exports when prices are high, African countries have a collective interest in maintaining 
open borders. For this reason, this policy objective needs to be tackled at a regional 
level.  
6.3  Implications for future research  
This report also identified a number of information gaps that need to be addressed in future 
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•  More information on transport and marketing costs.  As noted above, price-based 
spatial integration studies can identify co-movement, but cost information is needed to 
distinguish between lack of integration due to inefficiency and lack of integration due to 
small price differences.   
•  Better data on cross-border trade in food grains.  Efforts to date by the RATES project 
and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network  (FEWSNET) have been useful but 
limited in time and scope.  Reducing trade barriers would facilitate more accurate trade 
flow data collection because there would no incentive for traders to to hide or 
underestimate the flows. 
•  Wider availability of price data.  Although almost all African countries collect agricultural 
price data, the information is not widely available and is thus underused.  Regional 
organizations could play a role in gathering and disseminating food price data for 
analytical and commercial purposes. 
•  Capacity building in price and market integration analysis.   Government analysts, 
journalists, and policymakers would benefit from the ability to adjust price data for 
inflation and calculate price margins, while policy researchers would benefit from 
applied time-series econometrics.   
•  More research on the impact of alternative policies and investments on marketing 
margins and spatial integration. The existing research provides some information on the 
policies and investments needed to improve agricultural marketing efficiency, but does 
not provide the cost-benefit analysis or comparative return information that would be 
needed to prioritize investments.   
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